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... the progressive collapse, first of the 
German state and then of the German 
idea itself took its course .... Germany 
was not merely wholly defeated in 1919; 
it ceased to exist as a coherent nation, 
waiting in a state of rancor to be told 
what it was supposed to be doing. 
--Nicholas Fraser, describing the final 
days ofWWI. 
Harper 's, April 2002. 
Like Germany in the decade after Versailles, the 1990s for Russia have seen not only the 
implosion of the Soviet State and its sustaining idea, but also the failure of the original democratic 
impulse that gave birth to Yeltsin's federation as well as the subsequent dissolution, if not outright 
collapse, of the democratic-federative idea at its core. With the economic collapse in 1998 and the 
ascension to power ofVladimir Putin in 1999, Russian political elites were desperately searching for 
an alternative political philosophy to what they saw as an increasingly corrupt and emasculating 
situation. In the words of one commentator, many in Russia saw Putin's official election in 2000 as 
marking, " ... a clear watershed dividing the different historical epochs. In their search for an 
ideological framework for the future, many in Russia are looking to the past."1 
To end what many saw as a decade of humiliation at the hands of the "West", a new idea of 
national self-determination (samo-stoiatel 'nost ') was required - one that would be able to 
reconstitute an otherwise atrophied pride of belonging, provide an organizing principle for both 
domestic and foreign policy, and provide a rallying point for a broad cross-section of groups living 
across the territory of the former Soviet Union. What has emerged is the philosophy of a "Eurasian" 
cultural, spiritual, and political identity that ostensibly transcends any specific national appellation, 
1 Igor Turbakov, Russia in Search of a New Paradigm: Eurasianism Revisited Uoumal on-line] (New York: 2000, 
accessed 24 March 2002); available from www.eumjanet.org/depatiment.s_!insight/articles/eay0324QO; Internet. 
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but which could easily provide a philosophical argument around which a reinvigorated Russian 
nationalist movement might rally. 
This neo-Eurasianist movement is led today by Aleksandr Gel'evich Dugin, a man whose 
political influence is reflected in his role as the chief adviser to the speaker of Russia's lower house 
of parliament (Duma), and as a frequently cited expert on geopolitics within the Russian military 
establishment. Dugin is also a prolific writer on a range of other interests including religion and 
history. 2 He is widely-known as a kind of public political philosopher, although his writings extend 
far beyond the narrowly political. The Eurasianist ideas he professes include a deep respect for Nazi 
geopolitical theory, yet Dugin and his supporters represent an increasingly wide group of political 
leaders, social critics, and academics within Russia who view his resurrected Eurasianism as the 
ideological center around which to rebuild a resurgent Russian state that would effectively reunite 
most of the old Soviet Union under its ideological premise, or even physically reincorporate it into a 
Eurasian empire. The potential of the Eurasianist idea to impact current Russian political 
philosophy to this extent speaks to the importance of understanding the history of Eurasianism, and 
how that history has allowed the idea to potentially become a unifying ideology for Russian politics. 
The foundations for the idea of a specifically Eurasian cultural space have deep roots in 
Russian intellectual history. This paper will explore these roots both as a political philosophy and as 
a geographical and cultural construction. In doing so it seeks to use the history of the Eurasian idea 
as a touchstone upon which to evaluate the contemporary Eurasianist ideology being formulated and 
promoted by Dugin as the answer to the question, 'What is the purpose of the Russian state after the 
Communist era, and·what should it be doing?' 
The scope of this endeavor is extremely broad. It cuts across a wide swath of disciplinary 
fields. In short it deals with things that fall under the general rubric "Russian Idea", and as the 
2 "Liderii Dvisheniia," [short biography on-line]; (Moscow: Opud Evraziia, accessed 7 March 2002); available from 
bttp://www.eurasia.com.ru/ leaders/dugin.htmi; Internet. 
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caveat suggests, this endeavor is fraught with all the twists and knots any discourse on such a broad 
question always faces. In exploring the development of the Eurasian idea one runs into the classic 
problem of reading what appears at first to be a term of simple geography, a descriptor of a real and 
corporeal place, only to find that the term is in fact not just a descriptor of place, but a type of short 
hand for a whole pantheon of social, political, and religious values. Like other such place names, 
the term "Eurasian" is used to identify a type of mindset or a system of values that is characteristic 
of some defined geographic region. However, in exploring the geographical limitations of this 
mind set it quickly becomes apparent that the way in which the border itself was drawn and redrawn 
over time is deeply instructive as to the meaning of the value system connected with it. Moreover, 
the appellation Eurasia cloaks beneath it centuries of heated debate over what social and spiritual 
values are supposedly shared within the defined geographic space of the term. This paper seeks to 
unravel a few specific strands ofthis hidden patch cloth of meaning, mindful that many other 
strands, if not whole patches, will nonetheless remain tangled.3 
Drawing the Geography of Eurasia 
The idea of a distinct Eurasian geography is more or less taken for granted today. Numerous 
political groups, academic institutions, and journals adorn the,mselves with some form of a Eurasian 
title. But like all such definitions, the definition of what constitutes Eurasia and where it might be 
located was the product of an extended and unconcluded argument. It was a constructed idea that 
required a complex structure of arguments to support its assertions, and only after centuries of 
refinement and promulgation did it come to be considered accepted "fact." 
3 For an overview of a similar process see Timothy Garton Ash, "The Puzzle of Central Europe," The New York Review, 
18 March 1999. Longer works exploring this question are Czeslaw Milosz, "Central European Attitudes," in In Search 
of Central Europe, ed. George Schoptlin and Nancy Wood (Totowa, New Jersey: Barnes and Noble, 1989) and Jan 
Patocka, Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History, trans. Erazim Kohak, ed., James Dodd (Chicago: Open Court 
Publishing, 1996). 
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It was the Russian geographer V asiliy Tatishchev (1686-1750) who first sought to redefine 
the existing boundaries of Europe and Asia. Tatishchev had attended the Moscow engineering and 
artillery school, and later took part in the great Northern War against Charles XII of Sweden that 
Peter I (1672-1725) fought from 1700-1721.4 It was the gain ofthis territory during the war, and the 
subsequent construction of the city of St. Petersburg, which spurred Peter to have a new geography 
written which would fit the newly won territory into a geographical outline that moved Russia's 
place on European maps of the day from the Asian continent unto the European. This redrawing of 
maps was perhaps the most radical example of Peter's policy ofEuropeanizing, at least 
superficially, Russian society. If he was ever going to rebuffthe dominant European image of 
Russia as a barbarian backwater, it was essential that he "draw" Russia into the European fold. By 
redrawing the eastern boundary of Europe to include Russia, Peter could strengthen the position of 
his empire in the minds of the established European monarchs while adding historical justification 
for his internal policy of Europeanization. Any attempt to redefine Russia's political identity 
required that its basic geographic identity be changed first.5 
In order to write the geography Peter wanted, Tatishchev had to first discard the method 
established since antiquity of using rivers and bodies of water as the standard for defining 
continental boundaries. The reigning geographical definition of Europe as being bounded in the 
4 Mark Bassin, "Russia between Europe and Asia: The Ideological Construction of Geographical Space," Slavic Review 
50, no. 1 (Spring 1991): 5. 
On April29, 2001Russia celebrated the 315th anniversary ofTatishchev's birth. Despite his importance as a 
geographer Tatishchev's most famous work was his "Russian History Dating Back to the Most Ancient Times". He also 
is considered the first Russian historiographer, and spent much of his time studying the development human society and 
the underpinnings of state power. He is also considered the father ofthe Russian encyclopedic dictionary. After the war 
Tatishchev was given an administrative position in his beloved Urals, where he founded the city ofYekaterinburg. 
"Russia Marks Tatishchev's 315-th Birth Anniversary," Pravda, 4 April 2001, [journal online] (Moscow: 2001, accessed 28 
March, 2002); available at http://english.pravda.ru/culture/2001 /04/29/4444.html; Internet, and Apollon Kuz'min, 
Tatishchev, (Moscow: Molodaiia Gvardiia, 1987). 
5 In much the same way, the importance of geographical definitions in relation to cultural identity is apparent in present-
day Ukrainian independence from the Soviet Union, which was in part the result of a beliefthat Ukraine's cultural 
identity required that it secede from a physical union with Moscow in order to pursue a closer political-geographic one 
with Europe. 
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south by the Mediterranean Sea, in the west by the Atlantic, in the north by the Baltic Sea, and 
extending eastward to the bank of the Don (Tanais) river was an artifact of ancient Greek 
geography. This map of Europe was rooted in a picture of the world as divided into three separate 
massifs- Europe, Asia, and Africa (See Figure 1) which were defined by the major water ways, 
rivers, oceans, or seas, surrounding them. 
Russian geographical writings of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries basically repeated 
earlier western works which divided the world according to Classical divisions. These works 
identified the Don as the boundary between the two continents without further elaboration, and any 
inconsistency with the known reality of the river' s size and course, was simply ignored. It was 
thought that the Don was a much larger river than in reality, and the Sea of Azov as drawn on maps 
was stretched so far north as to make the area of land between it and the Arctic coast (which was 
itself not a known fact to the ancient cartographers) little more than an isthmus.) Thus the area 
separating the European massif from the Asia on maps ofthe day wildly distorted the true nature of 
the area. 
Long after western scholars had begun questioning the veracity of Classical geography, 
Russian texts were still repeating this error. Mark Bassin suggests that the reason this state of 
knowledge persisted as long as it did despite its obvious errors was because it was treated as an issue 
of scholastics rather than geography or topography. Classical knowledge was revered without 
regard to its correctness, and the question of the Europe-Asia boundary was simply too obscure to 
merit much attention before the Petrine reforms pushed it to the fore. 6 
So in place of this standard, Tatishchev proposed a strikingly different one- the velikiy poias 
- or great belt - as the defining "natural configuration" along which to delineate the continents, and 
by the eighteenth century Russian diplomats were already deeply engaged in promoting the idea of 
Russia as European empire. Yet despite the tenacious promotion ofTatishchev's new geography by 
6 Bassin, "Russia between Europe and Asia," 4-5. 
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the Russian court, Russia's place as a European power was accepted doubtfully, if at all, by 
contemporary European monarchs. Indeed, Catherine the Great ( 17 62-1796) who had felt 
compelled to outright proclaim in 1766 that "Russia is a European power" later wrote to the 
Prussian ruler Frederick the Great that her boastfulness had perhaps been a bit pretentious, like a 
raven donning a peacock's plumage for effect.7 
Figure 1: Schema of a "Tin 0 " map from the late classical period depicting the geographic worldview that was 
accepted in Russia well into the sixteenth century. Note the prominence of the Tanais (Don) river as it, along with the 
Nilus (Nile), neatly divide the known world into three "world islands". 
(Source: Professor Kathleen Coyne Kelly ofNortheastern University, [map on-line] available at 
http://www.dac.neu.edu/english/kakelly/med/beyond.html#anchor47158) 
The concept of Europe as handed down from antiquity to the people on both sides of the Don 
river was strictly a geographical concept. It assigned no cultural or political characteristics to the 
7 Bassin, "Russia between Europe and Asia", 12. 
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continents. Yet by the time of Peter's reign the definition ofEurope as a narrow geographical 
concept had long since begun to be conflated and identified with a broad range of other cultural 
traits, which were gradually wearing down the primacy of geography in the definition of what it 
meant to be European. So that just as that same geography was finally being challenged, it was 
becoming less and less central to the European concept. In place of the strict geographical Europe, 
there arose the idea of a culturally superior Europe. 
This transformation had its roots in the Middle Ages, when Christianity began to back away 
from its policy universal expansion, and began instead to cultivate the idea of the Church as the 
defender of a special Christian European realm. The transformation to an exclusivist doctrine 
gradually over centuries became a rigid belief in the moral, spiritual, and political superiority of 
European culture. European culture was understood to be the pinnacle of human civilization, and 
even though in area Europe was by far the smallest of the continents, it was widely believed as 
Samuel Purchas wrote that, "the Qualitie ofEurope exceeds her Quanititie, in this the least, in that 
the best ofthe world."8 
As this thesis of European exceptional ism evolved into a theory of European cultural 
superiority it became increasingly important for the Russian state to be seen as a member of Europe, 
or else it would risk being written out of the mythology of European civilization altogether. Indeed, 
it was Peter's own belief in European superiority that drove his radical vision of reform. And it only 
followed that ifEurope was the preeminent civilization and the embodiment of the highest forms of 
human culture, it was imperative that Russia be considered a part of this tradition; especially if it 
Russia wanted to be afforded the full respect of the established European monarchies in political 
affairs. Thus Peter sought parity with Europe on Europe 's terms. He fought to build a navy and 
extend his realm to the Baltic and the Black Seas, changed his own title from the odd-sounding (to 
8 Samuel Purchas, Pure has his Pi/grimes, Haklyut Society, Extra Series, 20 vols. (Glasgow: James MacLehose, 1905), 
1:248, quoted in Bassin, "Russia between Europe and Asia", 3. 
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European ears) "tsar" to the more regally European title of"Emperor", and moved the capital from 
the decidedly non-European city of Moscow to the new city of St. Petersburg, which he would build 
from the swamp up to become his "Window on Europe." 
All of the Petrine reforms were aimed at remaking the Russian empire in the image of the 
contemporary European empires he admired, and Tatishchev' s choice of the Urals as a demarcation 
line proved beneficial to this enterprise in yet another way. Tatishchev's marker meant that just like 
the burgeoning empires of Great Britain, France, and Spain, the Russian empire would be multi-
continental too. Although whereas the empires of Western Europe were naval ones, tied together by 
strong military and merchant navies, the Russian empire was unique in that it would be the largest 
land empire on earth. But like the European empires which consisted of a home "metropolis" which 
in turn controlled exotic, non-European colonies, Russia too would have her own exotica in the form 
of Asian colonies in Siberia.9 In fact, the image of Siberia in Russian literature, as well as in world 
literature, draws heavily upon its initial association with the orient, the alien, the dangerous, and the 
forlorn, giving it a place in the pantheon of Russian literature roughly similar to that oflndia and 
Africa in British literature of the colonial period. 10 The new geographical image ofRussia also 
spawned a linguistic counterpart, as the language soon began differentiating between the terms 
russkii, meaning an ethnic Russian, and rossiikii, which refered to a citizen of the Russian empire 
who was not considered to be of ethnic Russian origin. 11 
In Tatishchev's mind the Urals marked the division between two completely distinct parts.12 
By the late 1700s this view of Russia was widely accepted as an accurate description ofboth its 
geographical, cultural and ethnic characteristics. To some, the Asia-Europe boundary was still 
9 Bassin, "Russia between Europe and Asia" , 5. 
1° For examples of the Siberian image in literature see Valentin Rasputin, Siberia, Siberia, trans. Margaret Winchell and 
Gerald Mikkelson, (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1996). 
11 S.G. Pushkarev, DictionaJy of Russian Historical Terms (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), 31. 
12 At the southern tip of the Urals Tatishchev drew his boundary along the Ural river to the Caspian Sea, then southwest 
following the contours of the Caucasus to the Sea of Azov and into the Black Sea, Tatishchev, Leksikon rossiiskoi, 266, 
271; cited in Bassin, "Russia between Europe and Asia", 5. 
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farther east along the Ob or Enisei rivers -which represented a return to using the ancient standard 
of rivers for drawing geographic boundaries- but the basic division and its meaning was clear: to 
the east of the Urals was Asia proper and the colonies of European Russia, to the west was Europe 
proper and the newborn empire of the great European monarch Peter I. 
Writing the Philosophy of Eurasia 
The dawning of the 191h century brought a great and vast challenge to the ancien regime of 
the European empires which Peter and his successors had tried to emulate through their reforms of 
the Russian empire. The British Empire's colonies in North America had staged a revolution and 
won. France would soon follow suit, and throughout the empires of Europe a growing middle class 
was beginning to chafe under the bridle of aristocratic rule. 
In 1829,just a year before the July 1830 revolution in France, Pyotr Chaadaev's (1793-1856) 
first "Philosophical Letters" was published. In the "Letters" he lamented the Great Schism in 
Christianity which had resulted in Russia being cut off from Europe and the Renaissance (during 
which the gradual shift toward a concept of European cultural superiority had begun) and which had 
left her "neither to the West nor to the East."13 To redress this, Chaadaev called for a reunification 
between the split Creeds which would build on Peter's reforms and finally, fully unite Russia with 
Europe philosophically and religiously. But Chaadaev was also a great admirer of the European 
aristocracy, and with the French Revolution apparently sounding the aristocracy's death knell, he 
soon turned toward a vision of Russia not as the lost step child of Europe yearning to find its way 
home, but as the returning savoir that would rescue the faltering European ancien regime and with it 
its basic Christian principles, from the ruin of revolution. 
13 Pyotr Ia. Chaadaev, The Major Works of Peter Chaadaev: A Translation and Commentary, comp. Raymond T. 
McNally (Notre Dame, Indiana, 1969): 23-5 1, quoted in Peter J.S. Duncan, Russian Messianism: Third Rome, 
Revolution, Communism and After, (London: Routeldege, 2000), 19-21. 
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In comparison to the older British and French empires, the Russian empire had arisen late. 
But in Chaadeav's mind the youthfulness of the empire only meant that it was especially well suited 
for its new mission of answering the questions of social justice which were now threatening the core 
of the regime. In his "Apologia of a Madman" - the title was chosen because Nicholas I (1825-
1855) had declared him insane and exiled him to an asylum for his earlier writings because their 
tone of support for the status quo threatened to inflame anti-monarchist sentiment of the kind that 
had precipitated the Decembrist revolt of 1825. This, and his call for a return to Papal allegiance, 
had managed to offend both the revolutionaries and the government. He wrote: 
I think that if we have come after others, it is in order to do better than 
the others ... I have the inner conviction that we are called upon to 
resolve most of the problems in the social order, to accomplish most 
of the ideas which arose in the old societies, to make a pronouncement 
about those very grave questions which occupy humanity14 
His later "Apologia" not withstanding, Chaadaev's original "letters" had in part provoked the 
many and varied responses of the Slavophil writers. Most of these responses took the form of a 
renunciation of Chaadaev's original admiration for European society, which was now no longer 
understood to be the apogee of human civilization and worthy, if not demanding, of emulation. 15 
Instead, many of the leading voices in Russia called for the nation to turn its energy towards creating 
a polity that would stand as an exemplar to the entire world in its unity, justice, and strength against 
the decaying European order. 
Chief among the critics of European society and of those within Russia who wanted a closer 
alignment with Europe, was Nikolai Ia. Danilevskii (1822-1885). In 1869 sections of his Rossiia i 
Evropa (Russia and Europe) first appeared in a series of installments in the journal Zaria (Dawn). 
14 Chaadaev, The Major Works, 213-14. 
15 On the concept ofthe "intelligentsia" see Isaiah Berlin, Russian Thinkers, (New York: Viking, 1978), and The Russian 
Intelligentsia, ed. Richard Pipes, (New York: 1961). 
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In it Danilevskii broke with the pro-Western school of the intelligentsia and declared that Russia's 
destiny lay in asserting the uniqueness of Russian culture not as part of the European tradition, but 
in direct opposition to it. 
But before arguing for the distinct nature of Slavic (and by inclusion, Russian) culture, the 
reigning geographical notion of Europe- the definition ofTatishchev that had been aggressively 
promoted for over a century by the Russian court- had to be revised yet again. What Danilevskii 
did completely upended it. He maintained that not only was Russia not in fact a part of Europe, but 
rather that Europe as a continent did not exist! Europe was not its own continent, he argued, but by 
any reasonable standard of geography it was clearly just a tiny appendage of Asia! By this 
reasoning, if Europe as a geographic entity no longer existed then the whole idea that European 
culture represented the highest achievement of mankind was also gravely undermined. The very 
concept of any sort of cultural uniqueness having been predicated upon the idea of an underlying 
physical distinction, with this argument Danilevskii brought to bear a very powerful attack on the 
prevailing European claim of cultural superiority. 
The basis of this attack was a denial ofTatishchev's demarcation standard, the velikii poias. 
Danilevskii argued that Tatishchev's velikii poias was a weak standard to use in demarcating the 
Europe-Asia continental boundary. The Urals were not much of a barrier, he maintained, because 
not only did they leave a significant gap at their southern tip, but they were easily passable in 
comparison to the Alps, the Caucasus, or the Indian Himalayas. In proposing that the Urals were 
hardly a continental divide when compared to these Danilevskii, himself a botanist, ichthyologist 
and geographer, was drawing on the newly developing theory of plate tectonics which had been 
proposed some years earlier by Alexander von Humboldt and others.16 
Danilevskii's addition to the Europe-Asia debate was the added notion that the two halves 
demarcated by Tatishchev actually formed a unified "natural-geographic" whole, as indicated by a 
16 Bassin, "Russia between Europe and Asia", 9. 
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similarity of vegetation, topography, and land-form shape. Interestingly, Danilevskii spends little 
time on the technicalities of these claims, however, presenting them in a tone of mocking 
obviousness, using the example of a tourist who arrives in the Urals city of Ekaterinburg only to 
query his local guide "and just where are these mountains?"17 
Yet when he his finished, what remains is a vast unbroken landmass defined at its edges by 
the high mountain ranges of the Himilayas, Caucasus, and Alps and the large bodies of water that 
made up the Arctic, Pacific, and Atlantic oceans, and the Black, Mediterranean, and Caspian Seas. 
The gigantic, rolling, low steppe in the center of this outline is the Eurasian plain which Bassin 
characterizes as "an independent geographical world, self-contained and distinct from Europe as 
well as from Asia."18 Danilevskii's argument would prove lasting. It is essentially this definition of 
a "central plain ofEurope and Asia" that is meant by the term "Eurasia" as it is used today.19 
Danilevskii' s intent in creating this new image of a separate Eurasian space was to 
disconnect Russia, and indeed all of the lands within this Eurasian cradle, from the spatial definition 
of Europe and ultimately from European historiography as well. If the Urals were not a marker 
between European Russia and her Asian colonies to the east, then what kind of a European empire 
was she? Danilevskii saw Russian expansion east ofthe Urals as a type of manifest destiny, and 
explicitly countered the idea that what was really happening was colonization along the lines of the 
European "salt water doctrine". Indeed, this was the key reason he had dismantled the notion of a 
continental divide at the Urals, without which Russia could not fit into the theoretical framework of 
the European colonial model. 
The "salt water doctrine" held that colonial empires were the domain of sea-powers 
projecting control over water onto distant and alien lands, whereas expansion into contiguous land 
17 N. Ia. Danilevskii, Rossiia i Evropa, (Moscow: Moskva Kniga, 1991 ), 24-26, 256. 
18 Bassin, "Russian between Europe and Asia" , I 1. 
19 The Oxford English Dictionary attributes the first usage in a dictionary to 1868, under an entry "Eurasian-plain, the 
great central plain of Europe and Asia." Interestingly, the term "Eurasian" has a completely British usage meaning, "of 
mixed European and Asiatic (esp. Indian) parentage." Already by 1844 the term is being used to replace the earlier 
"East Indian" which had the meaning of being from mixed European and Indian (colonial) descent. 
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was not considered to be a colonial act.20 Russian expansion eastward was not a form of"conquest" 
(zavoevaniia) like British settlement in India, but rather a "free settlement" (putem svobodnovo 
passeleniia) in accord with the historical destiny of the nation.21 In short order Danilevskii had 
leveled the basic geographic assumption underlying the concept of European superiority and with it 
the rationale of the Petrine policy of creating a Russian colonial empire, and imperial navy in the 
European image. 
With a distinct Eurasian geography now developed, and the weak pretenses ofTatishchev's 
geography exposed, Danileskii moved to strengthen his argument by positing an equally distinct 
Slavic "cultural-historical" society (kul 'turno-istoricheskii tip) inhabiting his new geographic 
realm.22 In the book-length version of Rossiia i Evropa, which would be published two years later, 
Danilevskii asked, "Is Russia a part of Europe? .. . for better or worse- no, it is not ... [and] 
Neither honest modesty, nor honest pride can allow Russia to consider herselfEuropean."23 
His answer was that Russia should not, and could not, be a member of the European tradition 
because its "cultural-historical" type was characterized by greed, excessive individualism, and above 
all, violence.24 Danilevskii believed that all civilizations underwent an inevitable process of growth 
and decay. Accordingly he believed this process was an inimitable universal law, in the tradition of 
Hegelian and Marxist thought, and accordingly "Gerrnano-Roman" Europe had reached its apex as a 
civilization by the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and was now in decline.25 The current epoch 
20 R. Strausz-Hupe and H. W. Hazard, "The Idea of Colonialism", (Foreign Policy Research, University of 
Pennsylvania: 1958), 7. See also Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism: A Study of Its Origins and Background, (New 
York: The MacMillan Company), 1961. One modem example of how a country uses the "salt water doctrine" to deflect 
accusations of colonialism is China. It consistently basis its claims to Tibet on the grounds that Tibet is a contiguous, 
and thus natural, part of China. See [paper on-line] available at www.tibet.com/Humanrights/Unpo/chap2.html. 
2 1 Danilevskii , Rossiia i Evropa, 24. 
22 Danilevskii, Rossiia i Evropa, 469-472. 
23 Danilevskii, Rossiia i Evropa, 59-61 . 
24 Danilevskii, Rossiia i Evropa, 23-54; 71-91. 
25 The full title ofDanilevskii's original works is Rossiia i Evropa, Vzglad na kul 'turnye i politicheskie otnosheniia 
Slovianskogo mira k Germano-Romanskomu, transliterated as Russia and Europe, A Look at the Cultural and Political 
Relationship of the Slavic World to the Germano-Roman. It is worth noting that Marx's Communist Manifesto was 
published in 1848, and that by the time ofDanilevskii 's writing at least the German reading portion of the Russian 
intelligentsia was familiar with Marx's theories. 
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in which he was writing would witness the rise of the Slavic "cultural-historical type" (civilization). 
In his mind it was the realization of this fact that drove a jealous Europe to aggression against the 
Slavs. 
Furthermore, the European cultural-historical type was defined by certain weaknesses not 
characteristic of the Slavic cultural-historical type; namely, a penchant for domination and violence 
(a by-product of its Roman heritage), and capitalist greed. Danilevskii saw in the European colonial 
heritage and the spread of Western Christianity a history of domination, violence, and greed which 
he attributed to inherent flaws in European society that Slavic culture did not share. The Slavs, and 
among them chiefly the Russians, were characterized by their unity, peacefulness, and justice. As 
evidence, he pointed to their peaceful acceptance of Christianity, their unity under a holy dynasty, 
their supposedly non-dominating, non-colonial, settling of the vast Eurasian continent, and their 
recent emancipation ofthe serfs and subsequent land reforms?6 
Danilevskii also proposed a clash of civilizations that echoes the now infamous thesis of 
Samuel Huntington. He believed that an inevitable struggle between the two cultural-historical 
types would erupt over the fate of Constantinople and the Ottoman Empire; that the future of 
mankind itself would hinge on this battle, and that Russia and Slavdom would be victorious and 
usher in an era of peace and harmony.27 
In order to prepare itself for this task, Danilevskii called the Russian nation to rid itself of all 
corrupting European influences within its society and take its place at the vanguard of a Slavic union 
stretching across the Eurasian plain which would then act as an antidote to a diseased European 
society by virtue of its righteous example?8 
26 Hans Kohn, The Mind of Modern Russia, Historical and Political Thought of Russia 's Great Age (New Brunswick, 
New Jersey: Harper and Row, 1955), 191-193. Danilevskii, Rossiia i Evropa, 469-509. 
27 Danilevskii, Rossiia i Evropa, 460-468. 
28 He went so far as to title a chapter of Rossiia i Evropa "Evropainichan'ye- bolezin' russkoi zhizni" ("Europeanism -
an illness in Russian life"), 263. 
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Russia, being foreign to the European world by virtue of its [Russia's] 
inner workings, and furthermore, being too strong and powerful to 
take its place as just one of many members in the European family-
as just one of many great states - Russia cannot take a place in history 
worthy of itself and of Slavdom unless it becomes the head of a 
unique, independent political system of countries and unless it serves 
as a balance to Europe in all its community and wholeness [ obshnosti i 
tselosti].29 
Danilevskii's call in this passage continued the messianic chorus of many ofthe earlier 
Slavophiles, including Aleksei Khomiakov, who believed that, "History calls Russia to be at the 
forefront of universal enlightenment. It gives her this right because of the all-roundedness and 
fullness of her principles, and a right given by history to a people is a duty imposed on each of its 
members."30 
On the basis ofDanilevskii's geography and ethno-cultural theory, a pan-Slavic ideology 
was gaining force which defined itself in direct opposition to all things European. Any broader 
identity that might bridge Danilevskii 's cultural-historical types was excluded as an impossibility 
under the dynamics of his historical "law" because such a "shared human civilization" 
[obshechelovecheskoi] was a wholly unattainable, and undesirable ideal that could only 
(theoretically) happen "following the consecutive fposledovatel 'nim] or simultaneous [ sovmestnim 
pazvitiem] development of all cultural-historical types, [whose] distinctive activity has appeared 
throughout the historical life of man in the past, present, and future. 31 
The development of a broad cultural-historical type that might blend Slavdom and Europe 
was impossible, but the time was ripe for Russia to fulfill her historical destiny and lead the Slavic 
29 Rossiia i Evropa, 402. 
30 Duncan, 23 (quotation from Khomiakov, "Po povodu Gumdol ' dta", Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 2nd ed., I, 1 72-74.) 
31 Rossiia i Evropa, 124. 
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world to its rightful place of prominence, "in a word, Moscow should be the capital not just of 
Russia, but of an entire Union of Slavdom. "32 
From Eurasia to Eurasianism 
Danilevskii was able to build an argument for a unique Eurasian cultural-historical identity 
on top of his new geography on the basis that significant physical barriers had walled off the peoples 
of the Eurasian plain from most contact with outsiders, and that within this self-contained world 
there were no major land forms that had prevented communication amongst the various peoples 
inhabiting it. As a consequence the different groups living on this continental plain had developed 
similar social structures which revolved around the idea of collectivism (sobornost ') and 
communality, and not the dangerous poles of individualism competition which Danilevskii felt was 
inherent to European civilization. Out of this opposition Danilevskii called for Russia to take up its 
historically required mission and lead a union of Slavic peoples to the forefront of human 
civilization where the example of their unity and Orthodox holiness will save a failing world from 
self-immolation. 
With the fall of Constantinople in 1453, there had arisen in Russia the idea that the sacred 
mantle of Christianity had passed from Greece to Moscow. Moscow was now the "Third Rome," 
and it was subsequently the holy duty of the Tsars and the Russian people to protect the true 
principles of Christianity. Danilevskii saw in the creation of a Slavic Union the means to fulfill that 
destiny. In the realm of the spiritual and philosophical such a Union of Orthodox states representing 
the pure form of Christianity (chistaiaforma) would act as a shield against the corrupting religious 
and philosophical tenets currently driving the revolutions in Europe.33 (This was of course also a 
32 Op cit ., 384. 
33 Rossiia, 180. 
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complete rejection of Chaadaev's initial call for a reunification of Creeds, which was theoretically 
impossible according to Danilevskii). Politically, such a Union would have the advantage of 
strengthening the Slavic states militarily and diplomatically against aggressive powers, which at the 
time meant principally against Catholic Poland and the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans. 
This isolationist, messianic ideology had two core values: Orthodox righteousness, and the 
idea of a government of truth which acted directly out of this righteousness and in furtherance of the 
messianic aim. These two values- the bytovoe ispovednichestvo (the strict observance of the Faith), 
and the ideaia pravitel'nitsa (the idea of a government of truth)- placed Danilevskii's proto-
Eurasianist conception squarely in line with earlier exponents of the Russian Idea. Under such a 
system, as Tim McDaniels shows in his The Agony of the Russian Idea, there is little room for an 
opposing, yet morally and politically loyal, view on a given issue. Any dissent from official policy 
is not understood to be a valid political argument, but rather a nearly heretical attack on the one, 
holy, Truth as embodied by the ideaia pravitel 'nitsa. 
But then came the First World War and the 1917 revolution, which ushered to power an 
avowedly atheistic state. To those sympathetic to Danilevskii's vision the revolution was a 
complete catastrophe because Orthodoxy had been set expunged from the sustaining ideology of the 
revolution. Under Leninist interpretation it would no longer form the central core of a distinct 
Slavic culture and history. As a result, to those following Danilevskii's thinking the revolution 
represented the gravest form of an alien European philosophy ever imposed on the Eurasian cultural 
space since the reforms of Peter I. In the words of one Russian emigre observer the chief error of 
Marxist-Leninist political philosophy was that it completely failed to understand the distinct nature 
of Russia and the Russians, paid no attention to the "national tasks" of the nation and proceeded to 
"rape it politically" in accordance with foreign European philosophies.34 
34 Ivan Il'in, "Russkaia revoliutsiia byla katastrofioi," Russkaia ideia, ed. V.M. Piskunov (Moscow: lskusstvo, 1994) 
2:228, quoted in Tim McDaniels, The Agony of the Russian Idea, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996) 10. 
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When by 1920 it became clear that the Bolsheviks could not be defeated by force, a group of 
thinkers took it upon themselves to create the framework out which the revolution might eventually 
be overcome spiritually. The core of this group was led once again by a geographer-economist, Petr 
N. Savitskii (1895-1968). Making their home in exile in Sofia, they began publishing a series of 
tracts that had as their starting point Danilevskii 's Eurasian geography. Savitskii and the Evraziitsii 
(Eurasianists- they were the first to call themselves as such) proceeded from a conception of history 
that considered the Moscovite State the direct successor not of the Kiev an Rus, which was the 
generally accepted historical lineage, but of the Mongol Empire of Genghis Khan. 35 In making this 
claim, they more explicitly tied the peculiarities ofDanilevskii's Eurasian geography to the 
historical development of a distinct Eurasian culture. They would use this idea of the geographical 
giving rise to the cultural, to create not just a new geography but to develop the proto-Eurasianist 
idea of Danilevskii into a wholly independent political philosophy called Evraziitsvo 
(Eurasianism). 36 
The emigre Eurasianists married Danileskii' s ideas to the emerging concept of geopolitics 
which had first been proposed by the geographers RudolfKjellen (1864 - 1922) and Friedrich Ratzel 
(1844- 1904).37 Like Danilevskii, Ratzel's original training was not in geography, but in zoology 
and biology. This pattern is important to understanding the origins ofEurasianist and geopolitical 
thought. Ratzel's thinking was heavily influenced by Darwinism, which was the basis ofhis first 
book.38 But it also seems likely that Danilevskii's own conceptions of the geographical influence on 
35 The four "founders" included Savitskii, the linguist and ethnographer N.S. Trubetskoi, the philosopher and theologian 
G.V. Florovskii, and the art critic P.P. Suvchinskii. Their first publication was a collection called Iskhod k Vostoku. 
Predchuvstviia i Sversheniia. Utverszhdenie Evraziitsev, 1921. (Exodus to the East. Forebodings and Events. An 
Affirmation of the Eurasians). For an exhaustive bibliography ofEurasianist writing see A. V. Antoshchenko, 
[bibliography on-line] available at http://www.karelia.ru/psu!Chairs/PreRev/BIBLENG.RTF. 
36 Kul'turologiia XX Bek, Ensiklopediia, (Sankt-Petrburg Universitetskaiia Kniga: 1998) [encyclopedia on-line] 
available at http://www.yanko.lib.ru/books/cultur/encyclopcultXX/a.html credits the first known use of the term to 
Trubetskoi in his Evropa i Chelovechestvo (1920) (Europe and Humanity). 
37 Kjellen is credited with coining the term, geopolitik, in Swedish, in Berti! Haggman, Geopolitics, Classical and 
Modern: A Selected Bibliography and an Introduction, (Helsingborg: 1988) 2nd edition 1996, [book on-line] available 
at http://www.algonet.se/- jman/bertil/geobibl.html 
38 Ratzel's first book, Sein und Werden der organischen Welt (1869), was about Darwin's concepts. 
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human cultural development and political development have a foundation in Darwinian concepts.39 
Whatever the direct influence, Danilevskii certainly grounded his arguments in the similarity of 
vegetation and land forms throughout the Eurasian plain before extending the concept to explain the 
development of a unique cultural-historical type. Later geographers like Ratzel further used 
Darwinian theory as a conceptual link to formulate the idea of geopolitics, which sought to explain 
the political development of societies as it related to their geography. 
What Danilevskii had called the Eurasian plain, the Eurasianists (borrowing from 
geopolitical terminology) dubbed the Kontinent-Okean (Continental-Ocean) to show its symmetrical 
opposition to the dominant maritime environment as embodied in the European "salt-water 
doctrine".40 It was the basic geography of this broad expanse ofland-ocean, unimpeded by high 
mountains or any other major geographical formation, which had allowed the Mongols to capture an 
empire stretching all the way across the southern tier of the Eurasian plain. 
Indeed, according to this theory it was the experience of being under Mongol domination 
that had forged the earliest aspects of a cohesive Eurasian culture. The Eurasian peoples, 
particularly the Russians, had sought refuge under the wing of the Orthodox church during the 
Mongol conquest. Their cultural identity had been strengthened during this time in the sanctuary of 
monasteries and churches, where the idea of Russian Orthodox exceptionalism had given rise to the 
Muscovite State. The unification of the Russians was accomplished beneath the banner of this 
divinely inspired mission to overthrow the Mongols and had the effect of imprinting upon E1:1rasian 
culture the necessity of a strong centralized state acting on behalf of a holy people in order to protect 
"true" Christianity from both physical and metaphysical assault. 
With the addition of geopolitical theory to Danilevskii's original formulation, however, the 
Eurasianists of the early twentieth century moved away from the conception of a Eurasian culture 
39 Unfortunately, the author is not aware of any research into the extent to which Danilevskii was directly aware of and 
influenced by Darwin ' s writing. 
40 Petr Savitskii, Kontinent Evraziia, (Moscow: Agraf, 1997), 398. 
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centered around just the Orthodox Slavs. Nikolai Trubetskoi (1890-1938), accepted the idea that 
"The Russians, the Ugro-Finns, and the Volga Turks comprise a cultural zone that has connections 
with both the Slavs and the 'Turanian East,' and it is difficult to say which of these is more 
important." He stressed that, "Turkic blood mingles in Russian veins with that ofthe Ugro-Finns 
and the Slavs ... . [I]t is usually forgotten that our 'brothers' (if not in language or faith, then in 
blood, character, and culture) are not only the Slavs but the T~ranians ... . " 4 1 
The Soviet State, too, was viewed in much the same way as the Mongol yoke. Despite its 
roots in 'alien' European philosophy, the Soviet experiment nevertheless confrrmed the essential 
cohesiveness of the Eurasian peoples as a single culture expressed politically through the Soviet 
state. What was important was that the historical development of the newly "Soviet" peoples had 
been profoundly different from the individualistic capitalist European society situated just outside 
the Eurasian plain. 
Echoing Danilevskii, Trebetskoi argued in his 1920 Evropa i Chelovechestvo (Europe and 
Mankind) that not only was Russia's flirtation with European social and philosophical forms a 
mistake, but any attempt to implement those forms in society would inevitably fail because such 
integration was impossible. The "chauvinistic cosmopolitanism" of European society was unique to 
"the history of a specific ethnic group" (this phrasing probably also has direct anti-Semitic 
connotations) and could not be taken in by Eurasian culture because it was opposed to the "national 
psychology" of Eurasians. Even if some parts of the intelligentsia tried to incorporate European 
philosophy into Eurasian society they would nevertheless fail because some aspect of their natural 
(Eurasian) traits would persist. European society would never accept even just this tiny 
"Europeanized" strata because they would eventually recognize the remaining Eurasian psychology, 
41 N.S. Trubetskoi, "The Upper and Lower Stories of Russian Culture," in his The Legacy ofGhengis Khan and Other 
Essays on Russia's Identity (Ann Arbor: Michigan Slavic Publication, 1991), 81 -99, quoted in Mark Bassin, "Classical 
Eurasianism and the Geopolitics of Russian Identity" (paper on-line], (Presented online as part of the Collaborative 
Research Network project on "Situating Russia", 2 March 2001, accessed 1 May 2002), available at 
http://www.dartmouth.edu/-cm/russia papers.htm. 
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and continue to reject them as being backward. The result for Eurasian society would then be a split 
between the "Europeanized" elites and the people. 
Unlike Danilevskii, who ascribed to Europe intentionally hostile motives toward Eurasian 
culture, Trubetskoi insists that his is a structural analysis where the intentions of European society 
play no role in the theoretical outcome of the civilizational clash. But like Danilevskii, Trubetskoi 
sees the attempts at integration being made by parts of the intelligentsia as futile, because the 
theoretical requirements for a shared civilization- the simultaneous development of all cultures 
throughout time - is not possible. Trubetskoi goes on to repeat Danilevskii's description of Europe 
as being intrinsically militaristic and capitalistic, but contends that this requires that non-European 
Eurasian society adopt the technology of"westem" warfare and organization in order to defend 
itselfjrom that same technology and warfare. As a theory of historical development, Trubetskoi 
contends that this cycle results in a series of frantic sprints to catch up (prishka nagnat ') with the 
''West", followed by periods of stagnation and depreciation in Eurasia's technological level vis a vis 
Europe. Trubetskoi extends this theory backwards into history, arguing that Peter the Great only 
wanted to emulate Europe in order to steal its technology and then tum away from it once it was 
strategically safe to do so. In the end the only solution, writes Trubetskoi, is if the "Slavs, Chinese, 
Indians, Arabs, Negroes, and other tribes' constituting humanity, not the humanity about which the 
Romano-Germans love to talk, but the real humanity" fight the Europeans. This clash of "Romano-
German" civilization against the rest of the world is the only true conflict of world history.42 
Another group of thinkers who expounded views similar to this but who remained separate 
from the evraziistii, were the smenovekhovtsii (they drew their name from one of the journals they 
frequently published in, Smena vekh, meaning "change of landmarks.") Under the leadership of 
Nikolai Vasil'evich Ustrialov (1891-1937), they sought to support Russian imperial expansion 
through a variation on geopolitical theory. Already a year before the 1917 revolution Ustrialov 
42 N.S. Trubetskoi, "The Upper and Lower Stories", 114. 
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wrote, "The foreign policy of Russia must be a policy of imperialism. Imperialism is the legitimate 
way of all great states. Russia must behave aggressively."43 The reasoning was straight-forward as 
Ustrialov explained after 1917: 
Only a 'physically' powerful state can possess a great culture. The natures of 'small 
powers' have the possibility to be elegant, honorable, even 'heroic', but they are 
organically incapable of being great. This requires a grand style, a grand sweep, a 
grand scale of thought and action - 'the brush of a Michelangelo'. A German, a 
Russian, an English ' messianism' is possible. But, let us say, a Serb, Rumanian or 
Portuguese messianism grates on the ear like a false note.44 
Despite such differences in emphasis, the early formal adherents to Eurasianism developed 
the concept into a formal political philosophy that, while not wholly uniform, nevertheless did 
contain elements that were broadly agreed on. As an organizing political doctrine Eurasianism 
promotes a government whose legitimacy rests on the idea that the nations (people) residing in the 
area defined as Eurasia have a spiritually and historically inspired mission to reveal to the world a 
new truth. This purpose was setout in the introduction to the first Eurasianist compilation, Jskod k 
Vostoku (Exodus to the East), "With trembling joy, with shivering apprehension lest we give 
ourselves over to devastating arrogance, we sense, along with Herzen, that nowadays 'history is 
pushing precisely into our gate.' It is pushing not in order to generate some zoological "self-
identification" for us, but so that through the great exploit of labor and accomplishment Russia 
would reveal to the world some universal truth, as the great peoples of the past and present had 
revealed it."45 This revelation to mankind was in absolute opposition to the "Romano-Germanic" 
"world of systems" that had just pushed the world into war in an attempt to make its system of 
systems the "immutable norm". To the Eurasianists this was the present and past, but not the future. 
43 Iver B. Neumann, Russia and the idea of Europe. A Study in identity and International Relations, (London: 
Routledge, 1996), 111. 
44 Neumann, Russia and the Idea of Europe, 111. 
45 Petr Savitskii, P. Suvchinskii, Prince N.S. Trubetskoi, and Geogri Florovski, Exodus to the East. Forebodings and 
Events. Exodus. An Affirmation of the Eurasians, trans. and ed. Ilya Vinkovetsky, (Idyllwild, California: Charles 
Slacks, Jr., 1996), 1-2. 
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The future was a time when Russia would lead the world away from the destruction of European 
competitive politics, colonial market economies, and spiritually dead culture, toward a Platonic ideal 
of sobornost' and ideaia pravitel 'nitsa. In the aftermath of WWI, the 1917 revolution, and years of 
bloody civil war, the Eurasianist idea offered the comfort that the sacrifices of those years could 
still, someday, produce something sacred. 
National Eurasianism 
It was sentiments like these, drawing heavily from the deterministic tone of social 
Darwinism and religious messianism, that helped to revive the Eurasian idea in Russia after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. If Savitskii, Trubetskoi, and the other founders of classical 
Eurasianism were reacting in part to the devastation of WWI and the collapse of the Romanov 
dynasty, then the neo-Eurasianists of the late twentieth century are reacting to the aftermath ofthe 
Cold War and the construction of a new world order which they perceive as yet another morally 
bankrupt and geopolitically dangerous American/European hegemony being forced upon the 
Eurasian world. 
The roots of this reformulation reach back to the development of geopolitical theory, the 
geography ofDanilveskii, the economics ofMarx and Savitskii, and down to the cultural/spiritual 
critiques of the Slavophils. The contemporary Dvisheniia "Evraziia" (Eurasian Movement) - and 
the newly organized political party "Evraziia"- under its leader Aleksandr Dugin reconstruct 
classical Eurasianism for a post-Cold War environment primarily by strengthening its emphasis on 
geopolitical theory. Dugin uses Halford Mackinder's theory of heartland and rimland to draw the 
boundaries for a clash of civilizations between "Atlanticist" sea-powers and the Eurasian heartland. 
(Figure 2). 
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Figure 2: Representation ofMackinder's geopolitical theory ofrimland and heartland. (Source: 
Foreign Affairs, March/April 1999, 11.) 
As Savitskii argued in Kontinent-Okean the economics of sea transport are far cheaper than 
land transport. Consequently, the development of international trade and international monetary 
markets- globalisatsiia (globalization)- is to the great benefit of countries occupying Mack.inder's 
rimland, and detrimental to the heartland areas like the Eurasian plain. Dugin distills this into a 
simple statement expressed mathematically: 
Fate of Labour= Fate of Land, East. 
Fate of Capital = Fate of Sea, West. 
Labour = Land (East) = Russian (Soviet, Eurasian) nation. 
Capital = Sea (West) = Roman-German (Anglo-Saxon, American) nation.46 
Following the logic of this geopolitical and economic formulation, Dugin 's "platform" calls for the 
creation of a "Evraziiskii Soiuz" (Eurasian Union) in the image of the European Union, but designed 
to counter the hegemonic influence of European and American globalization. 
46 The newly founded party will hold its first convention on May 30, 2002, [press-release on-line] available at 
http://eurasia.com.ru/30-05.html; Internet. 
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Militarily Dugin supports the reintegration of the Commonwealth of Independent States as 
well as other "Eurasian" states into a Eurasian empire whose might corrects the loss of great-power 
status suffered by the Soviet Union after 1991. Indeed his best known work, Osnovy geopolitiki 
(The Foundations of Geopolitics) is about why the creation of this Eurasian empire should be an 
imperative aim of Russian (Eurasian) foreign and domestic policy, and how it can be 
accomplished.47 
With the transformation of his "movement" into a political party, Eurasianist ideology is 
moving to the center of Russian politics. According to a 2001 opinion poll, some seventy-one 
percent ofRussians characterize Russia as being a "evroaziatskoi" (euroasiatic) or ''pravoslavnoi" 
(Orthodox) civilization as opposed to a "western" one.48 This is fertile ground for a politics based 
on Eurasianism. In military circles it appears that Dugin' s Osnovy has had just as strong an effect. 
Retired General Makhmut A. Gareyev, former Deputy Chief of Staff put it bluntly: 
One of these unifying factors is the idea of Russia's rebirth as a great power, not a 
regional power (it is situated in several large regions of Eurasia) but a truly great 
power on a global scale. This is determined not by someone's desire, not just by 
possession of nuclear weapons or by size of territory, but by the historical traditions 
and objective needs in the development of the Russian society and state. Either 
Russia will be a strong, independent, and unified power, uniting all peoples, 
republics, krays, and oblasts in the Eurasian territory, which is in the interests of all 
humanity, or it will fall apart, generating numerous conflicts, and then the entire 
international community will be unable to manage the situation on a continent with 
such an abundance of weapons of mass destruction. In the opinion of the president of 
the A VN (i.e., Garayev himself-- author), there is no other altemative.49 
47 Aleksandr Dugin, Osnovy geopolitiki: Geopoliticheskoe budushchee Rossii, [book on-line] (Moscow: Arktogaia, 
2000, accessed 4 March 2002) available at http://www.arctogaia.com/publidosnovygeoi; Internet. 
48 All-Russia Center for Public Opinion Research (YITsiOM), "Survey Results on Russian Attitudes," 13 November, 
2001, [survey on-line] available at http://www.wciom.ru/vciom/new/press!press121115_32.htm. 
49 Stephen J. Blank, "Threats to Russian Security: The View from Moscow," (report, Strategic Studies Institute, 
Carlisle, PN, July 2000) 34. 
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Clearly Eurasianism as a political philosophy carried forward by Dugin is firmly anchored in the 
same idea of a historically necessitated empire according to the tenets of geopolitics and historical 
determinism as espoused by Ustrialov and others. 
It is at this point in the development of his variant ofEurasianism that Dugin's well 
documented association with fascism comes into play. Referring back to Trubetskoi, Dugin 
envisions the creation of an "obsheevraziiskom natsionalnizme" (all-Eurasian nationalism) based on 
their shared geopolitical history and their spiritual unity.50 The confessional unity among Eurasian 
nations is found in their shared idea of sobornost' and ideaia pravitel 'nitsa. To Dugin, Orthodox 
and Islamic societies both share an affinity for demotic, non-democratic forms of government that 
express their shared faith in the idea of a government of truth, even if they differ in the religious 
details of that truth. This is in direct contrast to western, "Catholic" Christianity: 
One of the poles - Capital - West - Sea - Anglo-Saxons' - is traced, as we saw, to 
[sic] Western Roman Empire, the source and starting point of all those tendencies, 
which have gradually crystallized in that pole. 
The Western Roman Empire in the religious sense is associated with Vatican, the 
catholic version of Christianity. Consequently, it is quite logic [sic] to appeal to 
Catholicism as a religious matrix of that pole. 
The opposite "Eurasian" pole is directly associated with "Byzantism" [sic] and 
Orthodox Christianity, for Russians are both the orthodox Christian nation and the 
authors of the first socialist revolution, they are also those, whose dwelling is the 
continental Heartland, which, according to Macinder, [sic] is the axis category of all 
forces of Land. To the same extend, [sic] to which the modem liberal West is 
secularized, generalized, modernized and universalized result of Catholicism, the 
Soviet model represents the utmost -:- also secularized, generalized and modernized -
development of Orthodox Christian Empire.51 
50 Press release of the Political Party "Evraziia," [press-release on-line] (Moscow: Political Party "Eurasia," accessed 2 
May 2002); available at http://eurasia.com.ru/30-05 .html; Internet. 
51 Aleksandr Dughin (sic), "The Paradigm of the End," [text on-line] (Moscow: Arctogaia, accessed 10 April 2002) 
available at http://arctogaia.com/rubli c/eng-rarad.htm#5; Internet. 
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The result of this division is an inevitable clash of civilizations along religious and 
geopolitical lines- Dugin refers to the "West" as the "Atlanticist" powers, which is a reference to to 
the colonial "salt-water" doctrine which he sees perpetuated in modern form in NATO -
necessitating the creation of a Eurasian empire in order to strengthen and protect Orthodox culture 
not only from an encroaching Western, "catholic", secularized, global order, but also to repair the 
damage done by the imposition of Soviet Communism. 
Like the earlier Eurasianists, Dugin looks at the 1917 revolution as a terrible misapplication 
of Marxism, arguing that while the revolution proved the ability of the proletariat to overthrow the 
exploitive Capitalist class, it was a "spatial and temporal mistake" because it did not occur where 
and when Marx had predicted it would, and because, "It came true only in combination with other 
factors, and, more specifically speaking, where Marx's political and economic doctrine was 
combined with cultural and religious tendencies which were quite dissimilar with cultural and 
historical discourse (suggestions) of"Capital" [sic] author himself." Communism's error was that it 
failed to recognize the nature of a "politically independent orthodox Christian state, in which the 
temporal power (Basileus) and the spiritual power (patriarch) are in strictly defined correlation, 
determined by the principle of the Symphony. Consequently, the deviation from that symphonic 
Byzantine paradigm means, "apostacy", defection."52 
Finally, "Capitalism is changing its symbol," writes Aleksandr Dugin in reference to Marx's 
use of the mole as a symbol for Capitalism: 
The classical mole has exhausted its opportunities. His dirty holes have pitted 
the unfortunate ground so that reality has become a universal sieve, from which the 
inhabitants of that side of the great wall make faces. The Era of the Mole has ended. 
Capitalism, as Gilles Deleuse [sic] asserts, is entering a new phase; the phase of the 
serpent. In the modern globalist world the distinction between dominating and 
dominated, between men and women, full and hungry, doctors and patients, teachers 
and scholars is erasing itself. An open society is constructed in accordance with the 
serpent principle. Everything merges into everything else, the continuous social 
surfing penetrates the strata of global society. Capitalism no longer bribes Labour, 
52 Dughin (sic), "The Paradigm of the End." 
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but creates Labour in the form of entertainment. The cloning of people only became 
possible because Capitalism managed to clone Labour. Now it is clear why in a 
private office of the largest banking oligarchy a fat, unblinking terrarium can be 
located. Behind closed doors the animal and its owner look at each other with cold 
eyes and motionless, heavy eyelids. The Master of the Society of the Spectacle, a 
hypnotist for the hoaxed, paralysed [sic] Eurasian crowds that are the last to lie down 
by the luminescent escalator and fall into the globalist hell of the End ofHistory.53 
From among the hundreds of pages ofDugin's writings, this excerpt perhaps more than all the 
others, gives a sense of the full range of what his resurrected and reconstituted Eurasianism means. 
Western civilization is a serpent, cunning and deceptive with its rationality, hypnotic with the glitter 
of its wealth, dangerous with its bite, and evil with its negation of the divine mysterium separating 
man and heaven. It holds out the temptation of god-like power and knowledge, only to deliver Hell 
instead. 
Modern Western political structures rest on the idea that, at least in the realm of politics, 
truth is a mediated commodity arrived at [produced] through a process of compromise, and not a 
revelation that must be defended from hordes of attacking heretics and thrust upon masses of 
wandering innocents for the good of their own [and the world's] salvation. If the very language of 
capitalism infuses the metaphors of the West's political discourse, i.e. truth as a commodity that is 
produced by processing in a system of compromise, then the language of messianism spoken by 
Dugin must necessarily clothe itself in the vestments of war, i.e. irreconcilliable differences that 
must first be defeated so that the Truth can then be imposed and expanded on. As an indication of 
the unease which Eurasianist ideas are received by non-ethnically Russian, non-Orthodox segments 
53 Aleksandr Dugin, "We are Going to Cure You with Poison, An Essay on the Serpent," [text on-line] (Moscow: 
Arctogaia, accessed 10 April 2002); available at http://arctogaia.com/public 'eng/sement.html; Internet. 
Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995), French philosopher of post-modernism, he was close to Michel Foucault who said 
that the 20th century may someday "be known as Deleuzian". 
30 
of the Russian population, a Tartar writer acerbically notes, "Eurasianism in the present-day 
treatment is an ideological cloak for the old, tried and true policy of territorial claims."54 
Beneath that cloak is hidden Dugin's darkly imperialist motto "Geography is our Fate" 
(Geografiia nasha sud'ba), but also the vision of a pre-modern, pre-imperialist world. It is a world 
still innocent of the mass infernos and rapes of the twentieth century, a world not lost in the mirrored 
labyrinth of its own thought. It is world of fantasy and nostalgia, built upon the foundation of a 
dangerously energetic messianism, and deterministic historiography. Placed in the context of a 
collapsed society, this vision ofEurasia holds the possibility ofbecoming ajustification for the 
slaughter and oppression it was meant to stand against. 
54 Raphe) Khakimov, Russia and Tartarstan. At a Crossroads of Hist01y, [paper on-line] (Kazan, Russia: Kazan State 
University, accessed 2 May 2002); available at www.federalmcart.ksu.ru/publicationslkhakimov3.htm; Internet. 
It should be noted that Tartarstan is a part of the Russian Federation. Such a sentiment, coming from a Russian 




Bassin, Mark. "Russia between Europe and Asia: The Ideological Construction of Geographical 
Space." Slavic Review 50, no. 1, Spring 1991. 
____ ,"Classical Eurasianism and the Geopolitics of Russian Identity." Paper on-line. Presented 
online as part of the Collaborative Research Network project on "Situating Russia", 2 March 
2001. Accessed on 1 May 2002. Available at 
http://www.dartmouth.edu/-crn/russia papers.htm; Internet. 
Blank, Stephen J. "Threats to Russian Security: The View from Moscow." Report, Strategic Studies 
Institute, Carlisle, PN, July 2000. 
Chaadaev, Pyotr Ia. The Major Works of Peter Chaadaev: A Translation and Commentary. 
Compiled by Raymond T. McNally. Notre Dame, Indiana, 1969. 
Danilevskii, N. Ia. Rossiia i Evropa. Moscow: Moskva Kniga, 1991. 
Dugin, Aleksandr. Osnovy geopolitiki: Geopoliticheskoe budushchee Rossii. Book on-line. 
Moscow: Arktogaia, 2000. Accessed on 4 March 2002. Available at 
http://www.arctogaia.com/public/osnovygeo/;lnternet. 
____ . Osnovy geopolitiki: Geopoliticheskoe budushchee Rossii. Book on-line. Moscow: 
Arktogaia, 2000, accessed 4 March 2002. Available at 
http://www.arctogaia.com/public/osnovygeo/; Internet. 
----. Press release of the Political Party "Evraziia." Press-release on-line. Moscow: Political 
Party "Eurasia," accessed 2 May 2002. Available at http://eurasia.com.ru/30-05.html; 
Internet. 
____ ."The Paradigm of the End." Text on-line. Moscow: Arctogaia, accessed 10 April2002. 
Available at http://arctogaia.com/public/eng-parad.htm#5; Internet. 
____ ."We are Going to Cure You with Poison, An Essay on the Serpent." Text on-line. 
Moscow: Arctogaia, accessed 10 April 2002. Available at 
http://arctogaia.com/public/eng/serpent.html; Internet. 
Duncan, Peter J.S. Russian Messianism: Third Rome, Revolution, Communism and After. London: 
Routeldege, 2000. 
Eurasia.com. "Liderii Dvisheniia". Short biography on-line. Moscow: Eurasia.com. Accessed 7 
March 2002. Available from http://www.eurasia.com.ru/leaders/dugin.html. Internet. 
Il'in, Ivan "Russkaia revoliutsiia byla katastrofioi." Russkaia ideia. Edited by V.M. Piskunov. 
Moscow: Iskusstvo, 1994. 
32 
Khakimov, Raphel. Russia and Tartarstan. At a Crossroads of History. Paper on-line. Kazan, 
Russia: Kazan State University, accessed 2 May 2002. Available at 
W\li.'\V.federaimcati.ksu.ru/publications/khakimov3.htm; Internet. 
Kohn, Hans. The Idea of Nationalism: A Study of Its Origins and Background. New York: The 
MacMillan Company, 1961. 
_ ___ . The Mind of Modern Russia, Historical and Political Thought of Russia's Great Age. 
New Brunswick, New Jersey: Harper and Row, 1955. 
Kul 'turologiia .XX Bek, Ensiklopediia. Sankt-Petrburg Universitetskaiia Kniga: 1998) Encyclopedia 
on-line. Available at http://www.yanko.lib.ru/books/culturlencyclopcultXX/a.html; Internet. 
Kuz'min, Apollon. Tatishchev. Moscow: Molodaiia Gvardiia, 1987. 
McDaniels, Tim. The Agony of the Russian Idea. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996. 
Neumann, Iver B. Russia and the Idea of Europe. A Study in Identity and International Relations. 
London: Routledge, 1996. 
Purchas, Samuel. Purchas his Pilgrimes. Haklyut Society, Extra Series, 20 volumes. Glasgow: 
James MacLehose, 1905. 
Pushkarev, S.G. Dictionary of Russian Historical Terms. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970. 
Savitskii, Petr. Kontinent Evraziia. Moscow: Agraf, 1997. 
_ _ __ , P. Suvchinskii, Prince N.S. Trubetskoi, and Geogri Florovski. Exodus to the East. 
Forebodings and Events. Exodus. An Affirmation of the Eurasians. Translated and Edited by 
Ilya Vinkovetsky. Idyllwild, California: Charles Slacks, Jr., 1996. 
Strausz-Hupe, R. and H. W. Hazard, "The Idea of Colonialism." Foreign Policy Research, 
University ofPennsylvania: 1958. 
Trubetskoi, N.S. "The Upper and Lower Stories of Russian Culture." The Legacy ofGhengis Khan 
and Other Essays on Russia's Identity. Ann Arbor: Michigan Slavic Publication, 1991. 
Turbakov, Igor. Russia in Search of a New Paradigm: Eurasianism Revisited. Journal on-line. New 
York: Eurasianet.org, 2000. Accessed 24 March 2002. Available from 
www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav032400.shtml. Internet. 
33 
